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COMMENTARIES
On the Apparent Paradox
of Learning and Realism
David M. Jacobs and Claire F. Michaels
Institute for Fundamental and Clinical Movement Sciences
Vrije Universiteit
Amsterdam, The Netherlands
This article first summarizes how the definition of perception as the detection of infor-
mation follows from the assumption of realism (e.g., Shaw, Turvey, & Mace, 1982).
The realist position appears to be inconsistent with the empirical finding that novice
perceivers often use nonspecifying variables and converge on the use of information
only after practice with feedback (e.g., Michaels & de Vries, 1998). We argue that the
appearance of inconsistency is due to the application and evaluation of realist princi-
ples beyond the scale of phenomena to which they apply. If the relevant principles are
considered at the appropriate scales, convergence on information and realism imply
each other. We also argue that the possibility of convergence and the associated use of
nonspecifying variables should always be considered in the analyses of experimental
results, especially if the information-granting constraints prevailing in the experi-
ment are different from those prevailing in natural ecologies.
The purpose of this article is to relate recent empirical findings on perceptual
learning with more traditional philosophical arguments in ecological psychology.
The philosophical arguments start from the assumption of realism and conclude
that perception should be defined as the detection of information. The empirical
findings indicate that perceivers converge on the use of information only after
practice and thus initially rely on nonspecifying variables. To what extent are the
realist arguments and the supposed convergence inconsistent with each other?
What is the origin of the apparent inconsistency? And finally, what should we
learn from the philosophical studies and what from the empirical ones? Before we
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address these questions we summarize, in turn, both the philosophical arguments
and the empirical findings.
THE CONSEQUENCES OF A COMMITMENT
TO REALISM
In this section we summarize our understanding of the philosophical position for-
warded by Shaw, Turvey, and Mace (1982; cf. Shaw & Bransford, 1977; Turvey,
Shaw, Reed, & Mace, 1981), who aimed to derive a theory of perception from the
assumption of realism. The position assumes realism, and to appreciate the argu-
ments, one should be willing to accept that the real world exists and that it can be
known at least in part. It would be sufficient to admit that one can know, without
any doubt, that trivial things, such as this article, exist. The assumption of realism
is stated as Principle 1 in Table 1, which, for future reference, also shows the eco-
logical principles to be defended later in this section. Note that it is not our goal to
explicate or defend rooting of a perceptual theory in realism. To the contrary, we
assume that position as our departure point and present only as much of the posi-
tion as seems needed to lay a basis for the remainder of our article. We refer the
reader to Shaw et al. and Turvey et al. for more extensive treatments of these issues.
It is important for the argument that by knowing, more is meant than correct be-
lieving; one cannot know something that is not true. Knowing that there is a dic-
tionary on the desk implies that there is a dictionary on the desk. Beliefs, on the
other hand, can be true or false. The claim that correct beliefs are all that is possible
is, in a way, a form of skepticism. The claim implies that, no matter how much one
investigates this journal, one can never know that the article exists, which makes
the claim unacceptable from a realist point of view. Surely, correct beliefs exist, but
in some cases, one can look for further evidence and perhaps obtain knowledge.
We do not believe that this article exists; we know that it exists. Likewise, the as-
sumption is that knowledge is possible, and this assumption is much stronger than
the assumption that correct beliefs are possible.
We are aware that no rock-bottom philosophical arguments can be given to per-
suade a skeptic, who might stubbornly deny knowledge about and the existence of
any environmental property. Even at the risk of becoming as stubborn as the skep-
tic, however, one can choose not to abandon the assumption of realism and, thus,
to consider what else must be true if that assumption is true. This means that one
128 JACOBS AND MICHAELS
TABLE 1
Ecological Principles
1. The world exists and can be known at least in part
2. The origin of knowledge is perceptual
3. Perception is veridical
4. Ambient energy patterns specify environmental properties
5. Perception is the detection of information
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needs some reply to the skeptic who asks how properties of the world can be
known; one needs to address the origin of such knowledge. Rationalist solutions to
the origin of knowledge include concepts as innate schemata and reason, whereas
empiricists argue that the origin of knowledge is perceptual. We agree with the
skeptic, and with Shaw et al. (1982), that rationalist solutions beg the question:
They presuppose the very knowledge that they seek to explain. The second as-
sumption, therefore, is that perception is the basis of knowledge (Principle 2).
At this point it is crucial to recall that we are searching a source of knowledge,
and not a source of true belief. This means that if knowledge exists, its origin must
establish beyond any doubt that what is known does in fact exist. Because, by as-
sumption, knowledge is possible, one must conclude that perception can be
trusted. This conclusion might appear at odds with the large literatures on illusions
and perceptual errors. The question, however, is the following: Should one prefer a
theory tailored to realism, which must be twisted to explain perceptual errors, or a
theory tailored to perceptual errors, which must be twisted to explain realism? In
our view, the practical success of animals is far more impressive than the excep-
tional cases in which perception appears to be in error. Still following Shaw et al.
(1982), we therefore prefer a theory to consider the reliability of knowledge before
it addresses apparent misperceptions.1 This first-things-first attitude forces us to
continue the argument and to accept that, because some knowledge is possible,
perception must be veridical (Principle 3).
The veridicality of perception might become more intuitively appealing if one re-
alizes that it equates the logic of perceiving to the logic of, say, reading. Reading a
book is an act that implies a reader, a book, and a certain relation between the two.
Reading is veridical in the sense that reading something, without a single exception,
implies the existence of the thing that is read. Likewise, perceiving is an act that im-
plies a perceiver, something that is perceived, and a certain epistemic relation be-
tween the two. Thus far it has merely been established that it is not possible to per-
ceive something, or to know something, if that something does not, in fact, exist.
The claim that perception is veridical means that perception is specific to the
environmental properties that are perceived, which is to say that it is related
one-to-one to those properties. If actual and perceived properties are related one
to one, a one-to-one relation must be preserved throughout the act of perceiving.
Consider a well-studied example, such as the perception of the weight lifted by an-
other person (Runeson & Frykholm, 1981, 1983). If this weight is indeed perceived
veridically, a one-to-one relation must be preserved at each step in the chain from
the actual weight, to the kinematics of the lift, to the operative optical flow, to the
operative sensory flow, and finally to the perceived weight. Vice versa the chain
must remain unbroken from the intention to perceive weight, to the operative sen-
sory flow, to the operative optical flow, to the kinematics, to the actual weight. Be-
PERCEPTUAL LEARNING AND REALISM 129
1Extensive treatments of the ecological interpretation of illusions and apparent perceptual errors
can be found, for instance, in Michaels and Carello (1981) and in Shaw et al. (1982).
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cause patterns in ambient energy arrays are a necessary link in this chain, percep-
tion must be related one to one to ambient energy patterns, and such patterns must
likewise be related to the perceived properties (Principles 4 and 5).
These final principles bring us back to J. J. Gibson (1950, 1966, 1979/1986), who
arrived at the same conclusions using different arguments. J. J. Gibson used the
term information to refer to ambient energy patterns that specify environmental
properties. Furthermore, he defined perception as the detection of information. The
arguments summarized in this section seem to indicate that this definition is logi-
cally implied by the assumption of realism.
CONSTRAINTS AS GRANTORS OF INFORMATION
We now briefly address a line of argument in the debate concerning Principle 4 that
is relevant to the following sections. Runeson (1988) argued that constraints are
grantors of information. Constraints are regularities that hold in to-be-considered
ecologies. Such regularities can be natural laws that hold universally, but also regu-
larities that hold only in more restricted ecologies. In the by now well-known ex-
ample of an approaching object, the optical variable tau specifies the physical vari-
able distance divided by speed given, among others, the constraint that the size of
the object remains constant. If, in addition, the speed of the approaching object re-
mains constant, tau also specifies time to contact (e.g., Bootsma, Fayt, Zaal, &
Laurent, 1997; Lee & Reddish, 1981; Savelsbergh, Whiting, & Bootsma, 1991).
Thus, in this example, the constraints of constant size and speed grant specificity
between tau and time to contact. More generally, Principle 4, which asserts the ex-
istence of information in a specificational sense, can often be defended only if rele-
vant constraints are considered.
THE CHALLENGE OF PERCEPTUAL LEARNING
Empirical research motivated by the principles discussed in the previous sections
can be crudely divided into two approaches. The first approach starts by carefully
considering the situation in which perception takes place. Relevant constraints
prevailing in that situation are evaluated for their information-granting potential,
and ideally, patterns specifying the to-be-perceived property are identified. Experi-
ments then aim to test whether the identified patterns can account for the percep-
tual or motor output of the human or animal under study. If not, the search contin-
ues to find other patterns that might also specify the to-be-perceived
environmental property or perhaps closely related properties. This approach can be
termed affirmative or principled because it does not consider possible violations of
the previously described principles; rather, the principles are used to guide the re-
search. A prime example of such principled research is the early research on inter-
ceptive timing, which meant to affirm that observers and actors rely on the
130 JACOBS AND MICHAELS
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time-specifying variable tau (e.g., Lee & Reddish, 1981; Lee, Young, Reddish,
Lough, & Clayton, 1983; cf. Bootsma & Peper, 1992).
A second empirical approach might be termed the falsificationalist or shotgun ap-
proach. As with the affirmative approach, this approach attempts to identify ambi-
ent energy patterns that specify relevant environmental properties, but it also con-
siders other variables that might not specify such properties in any obvious way. It
aims to determine which of a large number of specifying and nonspecifying vari-
ables best explains the observed performance. In the extreme, one might say that
the approach shoots as many variables from the hip as possible and tests all of them.
To the extent that the philosophical arguments in the previous section are viable,
one would expect that the predictive value of specifying variables is higher than the
predictive value of nonspecifying variables. Examples of the falsificationalist or
shotgun approach are the later studies on interceptive timing (e.g., van der Kamp,
1999; van der Kamp, Savelsbergh, & Smeets, 1997) and the perceptual learning
studies considered in the next paragraphs.
Recently, ecologically motivated research has addressed perceptual learning
with many dependent measures, including verbal reports (Michaels & de Vries,
1998), ratio estimates entered electronically (Jacobs, Michaels, & Runeson, 2000;
Jacobs, Runeson, & Michaels, 2001), and the timing of button presses (Smith,
Flach, Dittman, & Stanard, 2001). Three findings of such learning studies are es-
pecially relevant to the present purpose. First, novice perceivers differ from each
other in which variables they use, and they often use nonspecifying variables. Sec-
ond, after a limited amount of practice with feedback, perceivers converge on more
useful nonspecifying variables or even on variables that specify to-be-perceived
properties. This convergence is what we understand J. J. Gibson (1966; cf. E. J. Gib-
son, 1969) to have meant by the education of attention. Third, less change in variable
use is observed if the variable with which perceivers start already allows accurate
performance in practice, and more change is observed if that variable does not at
all allow accurate performance in practice.
Let us briefly illustrate the first two of these findings with an example. In several
colliding-balls experiments (e.g., Jacobs et al., 2001), participants were shown two
simulated balls approaching each other at some angles and speeds, colliding, and
separating at new angles and speeds. Perceivers were asked to judge the relative
mass of the colliding balls. Before practice, participants’ judgments often correlated
highly with the speed difference of the balls after the moment of impact. This speed
difference does not specify relative mass, and its apparent use, therefore, led to
less-than-optimal performance. After a practice phase with feedback, however, the
judgments often correlated more highly with the relative amount of motion
change—a variable that does specify relative mass—and the apparent use of such a
specifying variable went together with more accurate performance.
Such learning results, most notably the use of nonspecifying variables by novice
perceivers, seem to be inconsistent with the philosophical arguments presented in
the previous sections. If perceivers sometimes rely on nonspecifying variables, per-
PERCEPTUAL LEARNING AND REALISM 131
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ception is not always related one to one to the property to be perceived, implying
that perception cannot be the origin of true knowledge. Thus, it seems that either
the philosophical assumptions or arguments are invalid or the empirical findings
should be interpreted otherwise. It would, of course, be unfortunate if a minimally
constrained empirical approach would force us to abandon potentially valuable
principles. Given this, and our intuitive trust in realism, we dedicate the next two
sections to the search for alternative interpretations of the empirical findings.
More precisely, we consider whether the apparent use of nonspecifying variables
can be reinterpreted as the detection of information.
PERCEPTION VERSUS JUDGMENTS
Perhaps the apparent use of nonspecifying variables merely indicates that the depend-
ent measures used in the experiments, which we refer to as judgments, reflect infer-
ences or beliefs rather than perception. Participants might have perceived environ-
mental properties that were not of primary interest to the tasks at hand. Being asked to
report properties that they did not perceive, participants might have been pressed to
infer those properties. This would be in agreement with the previously described con-
sequences of realism, because it liberates perception from the errors that follow from
the apparent use of nonspecifying variables. In this view, the errors arise between per-
ception and judgments, rather than between the environment and perception.
We can use the colliding-balls example that was described in the previous section
to illustrate this view. In that example, the judgments of novices often correlated
highly with the speed difference of the balls after the moment of impact, which led us
to conclude that the relative-mass perception of novices is often based on this speed
difference, a variable that does not specify relative mass. Instead of concluding that
the perception of relative mass was based on this nonspecifying variable and, thus,
that the perception of relative mass was nonveridical, one could also conclude that
the novices veridically perceived the considered speed difference and that they mis-
takenly based the relative mass judgments on the veridical speed perception.
Unfortunately, accepting this use of the distinction between judgments and per-
ception implies sacrificing the seemingly parsimonious understanding of learning.
The claim that the errors in judgments arise between perception and judgments
suggests that explanations for the improvement of judgments should also be sought
at the level of inferences from perception to judgments.2 The view that one learns
132 JACOBS AND MICHAELS
2Note that this is not necessarily the case. Yet another possibility is that judgments reflect inferences
in an inferential mode of apprehension and perceptions in a perceptual mode (Runeson, Juslin, &
Olsson, 2000). In this view, the improvement of judgments can be explained by a transition from the in-
ferential to the perceptual mode. We have argued elsewhere, however, that the education of attention
might also occur within such a perceptual mode (Jacobs, Michaels, Zaal, & Runeson, 2001). Although
this is consistent with the mode transition as such, it makes the transition less appealing as a solution of
the present issue.
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to make better judgments on the basis of the same perception, in turn, is inconsis-
tent with the claim that learning is the convergence on the more useful energy pat-
terns because, in this view, the judgments are not based on energy patterns. Por-
traying the improvement in judgments as coming to rely on the more useful
nonspecifying perceptions seems hopelessly unparsimonious. In addition, it reveals
a second and probably more severe problem of the suggested separation of percep-
tion and judgments.
Because the use of apparently nonspecifying variables has been reported with a
wide variety of dependent measures, one would need to distinguish perception
from many if not all possible outputs that can be observed in experiments. This
would turn perception into an inaccessible entity. Claims about the relation be-
tween perception as inaccessible entity and the environment or ambient energy
patterns are largely unfalsifiable as long as empirical findings can also be attributed
to the relation between perception and the measured output. In short, emphasizing
the distinction between perception and judgments might make the learning studies
in agreement with the philosophical arguments but only at the expense of the pro-
posed explanation of learning, the falsifiability of the core ecological principles, and
the parsimony of our understanding of judgments. It would therefore be preferable
if we could find a realist interpretation of the learning studies that does not rely on
the distinction between perception and judgments.
EDUCATION OF ATTENTION VERSUS
EDUCATION OF INTENTION
If judgments indeed reflect perception, and perception is indeed veridical, an ap-
parent change in variable use must reflect a change in which property is perceived.
Such an interpretation of the convergence would redefine the task of scientists:
Their task would now be to determine what property is specified by the variable
that appears to be detected and, thereby, investigate what property is perceived.
The apparent use of nonspecifying variables would mean that the scientist has not
yet identified the property that participants intend to perceive, and a change in
variable use would imply a change in the property that the perceiver intends to per-
ceive. In this view, learning could be referred to as the education of intention in-
stead of, or as well as, the education of attention.
The viability of the education-of-intention approach rests on the assumption
that all variables that appear to be detected specify some environmental property.
Elsewhere (Michaels, Withagen, Jacobs, Zaal, & Bongers, 2001) we argued that
each pattern in ambient energy arrays probably specifies some environmental prop-
erty, which need not be a property that is relevant to the control of action or that
corresponds in any obvious manner to variables typically used in physics. Similarly,
one could assume that a perceiver can intend to perceive any property of the envi-
ronment. This means that if perceivers appear to detect a particular variable, the
PERCEPTUAL LEARNING AND REALISM 133
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experimenter might always be able to find a property that is specified by that vari-
able and conclude that the perceiver intended to perceive that property.
This attempt to interpret the convergence on the more useful variables from a
realist perspective is thus largely unfalsifiable. Nevertheless, the main problem of
the approach is larger than that. In the real world, intentions are not free to vary
with the information that an animal happens to detect. Whether they succeed or
not, fielders intend to catch balls and predators intend to catch prey. If the preda-
tor misses the prey, and one claims that the animal therefore intended to miss its
prey, one needs to introduce another concept to explain why the animal shows be-
havior such as approaching and chasing its prey—the job that intention in its origi-
nal meaning was supposed to do. In its original meaning, intentions serve to con-
strain task situations and thereby define the problems that perception and action
are supposed to solve. Given intentions, some variables can be said to be informa-
tion in a specificational sense and others cannot.
We readily admit that ecological studies do not typically articulate how inten-
tion does what it does, but ecological studies are usually clear in the job that inten-
tion is supposed to do. In the case of experimental studies, the assumption is that
perceivers follow instructions and, therefore, intend to perceive the property that
the experimenter asks them to perceive. This is not to deny that there might be
some discrepancy between the instructions and the intention of perceivers, but to
abuse this possibility and to make intention follow the particular variable that is de-
tected in an ad hoc manner is to throw out the baby with the bath water. How
should a theorist explain that missing the prey is somehow a failure if he or she has
already used the concept of intention to rescue the realist argument?
THE APPARENT PARADOX OF LEARNING
AND REALISM
In sum, our attempts to redefine the use of apparently nonspecifying variables as
the detection of information required us to strip the ecological principles of their
theoretical relevance, to a large extent, by using them as ad hoc concepts. It seems,
to us at least, that there is no alternative than to accept the empirical finding that
perceivers converge on the use of information and, thus, that novices sometimes
rely on nonspecifying variables. An additional argument in favor of the conver-
gence is that it seems to be implied by the detection of information. Have animals
always relied on information? If not, how did they perceive and survive before they
detected information? The most reasonable assumption seems to be that, by learn-
ing or evolution, they converged from the more useful nonspecifying variables to
the use of information.
Does this mean that, from here, the entire approach described in the first section
tumbles down? That is, does the convergence and the associated use of non-
specifying variables mean that perception is not always the detection of information
134 JACOBS AND MICHAELS
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Vr
ij
e 
Un
iv
er
si
te
it
, 
Li
br
ar
y]
 A
t:
 1
7:
54
 3
 A
pr
il
 2
01
1
and, therefore, that perception is not necessarily veridical, which implies that per-
ception can be, at most, the origin of true belief and, thus, that we cannot uphold the
assumption of realism? In our view, if one agrees to evaluate the ecological principles
with respect to the convergence, it does. However, in the act of destruction, the con-
vergence reconstructs the very same principles from the opposite side.
The additional assumption required for the reconstruction is that the conver-
gence is arbitrarily fast compared to changes in information-granting constraints. If
that is the case, one can assume that information remains constant with respect to
the convergence. A perceptual system that continuously converges on information
can thereby be assumed to approximate the detection of information to an arbi-
trary extent sooner or later. Because the changes in variable use are assumed to be
fast with respect to the changes in constraints, situations in which the detection of
information is not approximated are necessarily short with respect to larger time
scales. If the use of nonspecifying variables does not last over the minimal time
units relevant to phenomena under study, in our case realism, one can define per-
ception, with respect to those phenomena, as the detection of information.
From here, the arguments described in the first section can be rolled off the
other way around. Because perception is the detection of information, and infor-
mation is related one to one to the properties to be perceived, perception is
veridical. Veridical perception can be the source of true knowledge. Thus, because
we veridically perceive properties of our environments, we can know such proper-
ties. In sum, we have argued that the convergence is inconsistent with realism, but
that, at the same time, the notions appear to imply each other. This is what we call
the apparent paradox of learning and realism. The next section considers a possible so-
lution of the paradox which, as hinted in the previous paragraphs, lies in the scale
dependence of theoretical principles.
THE SCALE OF ECOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES
This section argues that theoretical principles that explain phenomena at one scale
of analysis do not necessarily apply to phenomena at other scales. The argument is
introduced with an analogy. Imagine a biologist who studies how cats manage to at-
tain an upright posture during free fall, and another biologist who studies
home-finding behavior in cats and bases his or her theory on the apparent truth
that cats live and displace themselves on the ground. The theories of these biolo-
gists appear incompatible because animals and other objects that are assumed to be
on the ground cannot engage in free fall. The theories are compatible, however,
and they even support each other, if the relevant principles are applied only at the
scale of the phenomena that they are supposed to explain. Cats can be assumed to
be on the ground on the long term precisely because they fall on the short term, and
they must fall on the short term because they live on the ground on the long term.
PERCEPTUAL LEARNING AND REALISM 135
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Analogously, perceptual learning and realism appear inconsistent with each
other only if the relevant principles are applied beyond the appropriate scales. In
our view, the assumption of realism cannot be maintained if one considers
short-scale phenomena. Similarly, perceptual systems cannot be said to exploit
nonspecifying variables if the minimal time units are taken with respect to the lon-
ger scale of realism.3 If, in contrast, one applies the principles to the appropriate
time scales, learning and realism imply each other. That is, short-term convergence
guarantees that information will be detected on the long term, and the assumption
of realism implies that perceptual systems must somehow converge on information
on the short term. To come back to the analogy, the convergence continuously
pushes perceptual systems to the use of information, like gravity that continuously
attracts cats and other objects to the surface of the earth.
It might be helpful to note the similarity between these arguments and the en-
slaving principle and circular causality that feature in dynamical systems theory
(e.g., Haken, 1977, 1997). In that theory, the time scale of microscopic compo-
nents is often supposed to be arbitrarily small with regard to the time scale of mac-
roscopic behavior that is generated by these components, which is to say that the
microscopic processes are arbitrarily quick with regard to the macroscopic pro-
cesses. In part because of this scale difference, the microscopic processes can often
be said to adapt instantaneously to changes in the macroscopic patterns. That is,
the macroscopic patterns impose their structure on (or enslave) the generating mi-
croscopic components. A widely appreciated consequence of this enslaving is that
the study of macroscopic behavior does not necessarily require an understanding of
the generating microscopic processes (e.g., Beek, Jacobs, Daffertshofer, & Huys,
2001). Similarly, we argue that ecological psychologists might justifiably disregard
principles at the (microscopic) scale of convergence but only if the phenomena un-
der study reside at the (macroscopic) scale of realism.
Further intuitive support for the claim that the ecological principles should not
always be evaluated at smaller event scales can be derived from the intractable
multitude of ambient energy patterns. An endless number of variables can be de-
fined that do not specify a particular to-be-perceived property. Many of the
nonspecifying variables might approximate specifying variables to an arbitrary de-
gree and could thus lead to highly accurate perception. Minimal noise in percep-
tual systems, say at the neural level, can be expected to lead to minimal change in
whichever of the many variables are detected. Given the multitude of perhaps
136 JACOBS AND MICHAELS
3Our arguments do not necessarily imply that a perceiver must perceive, say, a book on a desk for a
period relevant to the longer time scale to know that there is indeed a book on the desk. What is implied
is that the perceiver or his or her ancestors must have perceived objects such as books and desks for suf-
ficiently long periods so that perceptual systems can be said to rely on information. If so, even percep-
tion considered as a short-scale phenomenon might be veridical. More important, however, such
short-scale perception is not necessarily veridical, and one can therefore accept short-scale perception
as the basis of knowledge only if one explains how—or assumes that—perceptual systems are sensitive
to the sufficiency of the convergence.
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highly useful nonspecifying variables, such change can further be expected to lead
to the detection of nonspecifying variables, at least in some cases. Therefore, if
considered seriously, such minimal noise can lead to the rejection of the principle
that perception is the detection of information (Principle 5 in Table 1). It seems in-
tuitively clear, however, that this scale of analysis (i.e., the scale of change in vari-
able use because of minimal neural noise) should not always be considered seri-
ously with respect to the ecological principles.
CONCLUSIONS
If, as defended in this article, different principles should be evaluated and applied
at different scales, generally accepted principles might not apply to all phenomena
under study. This means that, before scientists apply any principles, they should
carefully compare the scales of the relevant principles and phenomena. We have
argued that the principles derived from realism might apply to perception in situa-
tions in which information-granting constraints remain constant relative to the
convergence on information because, if the constraints remain constant, the con-
tinuous presence of the convergence guarantees the detection of information. For
everyday environments, such a constancy of constraints seems reasonable to as-
sume. Experimental tasks, on the other hand, often entail abrupt changes in infor-
mation-granting constraints and, thus, in the available information. This implies
that the principles derived from realism might not be suited to study perception in
such situations. Moreover, empirical learning studies seem to indicate that the
principles of convergence can often be useful to study experimental tasks. There-
fore, in our view, experimenters should not lightly reject the principles of conver-
gence on information and the associated use of nonspecifying variables in favor of
the traditional ecological principles.
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